/ - Diff - Haketilo - Hydrilla issue tracker

     #FROM common/misc.js IMPORT gen_nonce, csp_header_regex
     const html_ns = "http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";
     const svg_ns = "http://www.w3.org/2000/svg";
     document.content_loaded = document.readyState === "complete";
     const wait_loaded = e => e.content_loaded ? Promise.resolve() :
           new Promise(c => e.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", c, {once: true}));
-...
          */
         if (some_attr_blocked) {
     	const replacement_elem = document.createElement("a");
     	/* Prevent this node from being processed by our observer. */
     	replacement_elem.haketilo_trusted_node = true;
     	element.replaceWith(replacement_elem);
     	replacement_elem.replaceWith(element);
+        }
-...
         element.haketilo_sanitized_onevent = true;
         for (const attribute_node of [...(element.attributes || [])]) {
     	const attr = attribute_node.localName, attr_lo = attr.toLowerCase();;
     	if (!/^on/.test(attr_lo) || !(attr_lo in element.wrappedJSObject))
     	const attr = attribute_node.localName, attr_lo = attr.toLowerCase();
     	if (!/^on/.test(attr_lo) || !(attr_lo in element))
     	    continue;
     	/*
-...
+    }
     #ENDIF
     function start_mo_sanitizing(doc) {
         if (!doc.content_loaded) {
     	function mutation_handler(mutation) {
     	    mutation.addedNodes.forEach(sanitize_element_urls);
     /*
      * Sanitize elements on-the-fly as they appear using MutationObserver.
+     *
      * Under Abrowser 97 it was observed that MutationObserver does not always work
      * as is should. When trying to observe nodes of an XMLDocument the behavior was
      * as if the "subtree" option to MutationObserver.observe() was ignored. To work
      * around this we avoid using the "subtree" option altogether and have the same
      * code work in all scenarios.
      */
     function MOSanitizer(root) {
         this.root = root;
         this.recursively_sanitize(root);
         this.mo = new MutationObserver(ms => this.handle_mutations(ms));
+    }
     MOSanitizer.prototype.observe = function() {
         let elem = this.root;
         while (elem && !elem.haketilo_trusted_node) {
     	this.mo.observe(elem, {childList: true});
     	elem = elem.lastElementChild;
+        }
+    }
     MOSanitizer.prototype.handle_mutations = function(mutations) {
         for (const mut of mutations) {
     	for (const new_node of mut.addedNodes)
     	    this.recursively_sanitize(new_node);
+        }
         this.mo.disconnect();
         this.observe();
+    }
     MOSanitizer.prototype.recursively_sanitize = function(elem) {
         const to_process = [elem];
         while (to_process.length > 0) {
     	const current_elem = to_process.pop();
     	if (current_elem.haketilo_trusted_node ||
     	    current_elem.nodeType !== this.root.ELEMENT_NODE)
     	    continue;
     	to_process.push(...current_elem.children);
     	sanitize_element_urls(current_elem);
     #IF MOZILLA
     	    mutation.addedNodes.forEach(sanitize_element_onevent);
     	sanitize_element_onevent(current_elem);
     #ENDIF
+    	}
     	const mo = new MutationObserver(ms => ms.forEach(mutation_handler));
     	mo.observe(doc, {childList: true, subtree: true});
     	wait_loaded(doc).then(() => mo.disconnect());
+        }
+    }
     MOSanitizer.prototype.start = function() {
         this.recursively_sanitize(this.root);
         this.observe();
+    }
     MOSanitizer.prototype.stop = function() {
         this.mo.disconnect();
+    }
     #IF MOZILLA
     /*
      * Normally, we block scripts with CSP. However, Mozilla does optimizations that
-...
      * applying this CSP to non-inline `<scripts>' in certain scenarios.
      */
     function prevent_script_execution(event) {
         if (!event.target.haketilo_payload)
     	event.preventDefault();
         event.preventDefault();
+    }
     #ENDIF
-...
      * javascript execution.
      */
     async function sanitize_document(doc, policy) {
         const root = doc.documentElement;
         const substitute_doc =
     	  new DOMParser().parseFromString("<!DOCTYPE html>", "text/html");
     #IF MOZILLA
         /*
          * Blocking of scripts that are in the DOM from the beginning. Needed for
          * Mozilla.
          */
         const listener_args = ["beforescriptexecute", prevent_script_execution];
         doc.addEventListener(...listener_args);
         substitute_doc.addEventListener(...listener_args);
         wait_loaded(doc).then(() => doc.removeEventListener(...listener_args));
         sanitize_tree_urls(doc.documentElement);
         sanitize_tree_onevent(doc.documentElement);
     #ENDIF
         if (!doc.content_loaded) {
     	const sanitizer = new MOSanitizer(doc.documentElement);
     	sanitizer.start();
     	wait_loaded(doc).then(() => sanitizer.stop());
+        }
         /*
          * Ensure our CSP rules are employed from the beginning. This CSP injection
          * method is, when possible, going to be applied together with CSP rules
-...
          * Root node gets hijacked now, to be re-attached after <head> is loaded
          * and sanitized.
          */
         const root = doc.documentElement;
         root.replaceWith(temporary_html);
     #IF MOZILLA
         /*
          * To be able to handle the onbeforescriptexecute event for scripts that
          * appear under detached document.
          */
         substitute_doc.documentElement.replaceWith(root);
     #ENDIF
         /*
          * When we don't inject payload, we neither block document's CSP `<meta>'
-...
     	    .forEach(m => sanitize_meta(m, policy));
+        }
         sanitize_tree_urls(root);
         root.querySelectorAll("script").forEach(s => sanitize_script(s, policy));
         const scripts = [...root.getElementsByTagNameNS(html_ns, "script"),
     		     ...root.getElementsByTagNameNS(svg_ns, "svg")];
         scripts.forEach(s => sanitize_script(s, policy));
         temporary_html.replaceWith(root);
         root.querySelectorAll("script").forEach(s => desanitize_script(s, policy));
     #IF MOZILLA
         sanitize_tree_onevent(root);
     #ENDIF
         start_mo_sanitizing(doc);
         scripts.forEach(s => desanitize_script(s, policy));
+    }
     async function _disable_service_workers() {

         </script>
       </head>
       <body>
         <button id="clickme1"
     	    onclick="window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'on'];"
     	    blocked-onclick="some useful data">
           Click Meee!
         </button>
         <a id="clickme2"
            href="javascript:window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'href'];void(0);">
           Click Meee!
         </a>
         <iframe src="javascript:void(window.parent.__run = [...(window.parent.__run || []), 'src']);">
         </iframe>
         <object data="javascript:window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'data'];">
         </object>
         <!--
     	Put all objects under a <div> to make sure the Mutation Observer does
     	indeed correctly report changes in subtrees (there are problems with
     	this in XML documents).
           -->
         <div>
           <button id="clickme1"
     	      onclick="window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'on'];"
     	      blocked-onclick="some useful data">
     	Click Meee!
           </button>
           <a id="clickme2"
     	 href="javascript:window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'href'];void(0);">
     	Click Meee!
           </a>
           <iframe src="javascript:void(window.parent.__run = [...(window.parent.__run || []), 'src']);">
           </iframe>
           <object data="javascript:window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'data'];">
           </object>
         </div>
       </body>
     </html>

     <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
     <!--
         SPDX-License-Identifier: CC0-1.0
         A testing XML document with various scripts that need to get blocked.
         This file is part of Haketilo.
         Copyright (C) 2021, 2022 Wojtek Kosior <koszko@koszko.org>
         This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
         it under the terms of the CC0 1.0 Universal License as published by
         the Creative Commons Corporation.
         This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
         but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
         MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
         CC0 1.0 Universal License for more details.
       -->
     <fruits>
       <!--
           The following will not execute since it is not recognized as either HTML
           or SVG script.
       -->
       <script>
         window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'banana'];
       </script>
       <html:img xmlns:html="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"
     	    src=""
     	    onload="window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'melon'];console.log('delme melon')">
       </html:img>
       <!-- Will execute -->
       <html:script xmlns:html="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
         window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'grape'];
       </html:script>
       <!-- Will also execute -->
       <vector-graphics:script xmlns:vector-graphics="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
         window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'raspberry'];
       </vector-graphics:script>
       <apple>
         <svg viewBox="0 0 10 14" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
           <!-- Will run when clicked -->
           <circle id="idaret_circle" cx="5" cy="5" r="4"
     	      onclick="window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'idaret'];" />
           <!-- Will *NOT* run when clicked -->
           <circle id="nowamak_circle" cx="5" cy="13" r="4"
     	      some-unknown:onclick="window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'nowamak'];"
     	      xmlns:some-unknown="https://example.org/blah/blah" />
         </svg>
       </apple>
       <!--
           In case of wrong namespace URI (or lack thereof), svg subtree will not
           be recognized as SVG at all
       -->
       <svg>
         <!-- Will neither run nor be drawn by the browser -->
         <circle id="mango_circle" cx="5" cy="5" r="4"
     	    onclick="window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'mango'];" />
       </svg>
       <svg viewBox="0 0 10" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/sv">
         <!-- Will neither run nor be drawn by the browser -->
         <circle id="annoying_circle" cx="5" cy="5" r="4"
     	    onclick="window.__run = [...(window.__run || []), 'orange'];" />
       </svg>
     </fruits>

     @pytest.mark.parametrize('csp_off_setting', [{}, {'csp_off': True}])
     def test_policy_enforcing_html(driver, execute_in_page, csp_off_setting):
         """
         A test case of sanitizing <script>s and intrinsic javascript in pages.
         A test case of sanitizing <script>s and intrinsic JavaScript in HTML pages.
         """
         def assert_properly_blocked():
         def click_all():
             for i in range(1, 3):
                 driver.find_element_by_id(f'clickme{i}').click()
         def assert_properly_blocked():
             click_all()
             assert set(driver.execute_script('return window.__run || [];')) == set()
             assert bool(csp_off_setting) == are_scripts_allowed(driver)
-...
             **csp_off_setting
         })
         for i in range(1, 3):
             driver.find_element_by_id(f'clickme{i}').click()
         click_all()
         assert set(driver.execute_script('return window.__run || [];')) == \
             {'inline', 'on', 'href', 'src', 'data'}
-...
         assert_properly_blocked()
         assert are_scripts_allowed(driver, nonce)
     # Test function analogous to that for HTML page.
     @pytest.mark.ext_data({'content_script': content_script})
     @pytest.mark.usefixtures('webextension')
     @pytest.mark.parametrize('csp_off_setting', [{}, {'csp_off': True}])
     def test_policy_enforcing_xml(driver, execute_in_page, csp_off_setting):
         """
         A test case of sanitizing <script>s and intrinsic JavaScript in XML
         documents.
         """
         def click_all():
             for name in ('idaret', 'nowamak', 'mango', 'annoying'):
                 elem = driver.find_element_by_id(f'{name}_circle')
                 try:
                     elem.click()
                 except:
                     pass
         def assert_properly_blocked():
             click_all()
             try:
                 assert set(driver.execute_script('return window.__run || [];')) == set()
             except:
                 from time import sleep
                 sleep(100000)
             assert bool(csp_off_setting) == are_scripts_allowed(driver)
         # First, see if scripts run when not blocked.
         get(driver, 'https://gotmyowndoma.in/scripts_to_block_2.xml', {
             'policy': allow_policy,
             **csp_off_setting
         })
         click_all()
         assert set(driver.execute_script('return window.__run || [];')) == \
             {'grape', 'raspberry', 'idaret', 'melon'}
         assert are_scripts_allowed(driver)
         # Now, verify scripts don't run when blocked.
         get(driver, 'https://gotmyowndoma.in/scripts_to_block_2.xml', {
             'policy': block_policy,
             **csp_off_setting
         })
         assert_properly_blocked()
         # Now, verify only scripts with nonce can run when payload is injected.
         get(driver, 'https://gotmyowndoma.in/scripts_to_block_2.xml', {
             'policy': payload_policy,
             **csp_off_setting
         })
         assert_properly_blocked()
         assert are_scripts_allowed(driver, nonce)

             return driver.execute_script(
                 '''
                 document.haketilo_scripts_allowed = false;
                 const script = document.createElement("script");
                 const html_ns = "http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";
                 const script = document.createElementNS(html_ns, "script");
                 script.innerHTML = "document.haketilo_scripts_allowed = true;";
                 if (arguments[0])
                     script.setAttribute("nonce", arguments[0]);
                 document.head.append(script);
                 (document.head || document.documentElement).append(script);
                 return document.haketilo_scripts_allowed;
                 ''',
                 nonce)

         'https://gotmyowndoma.in/scripts_to_block_1.html':
         (200, {}, here / 'data' / 'pages' / 'scripts_to_block_1.html'),
         'https://gotmyowndoma.in/scripts_to_block_2.xml':
         (200, {}, here / 'data' / 'pages' / 'scripts_to_block_2.xml'),
         'https://anotherdoma.in/resource/blocked/by/CORS.json':
         lambda command, get_params, post_params: (200, {}, some_data),

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Revision 96efcc33

Added by koszko over 1 year ago