Revision d09b7ee1
Added by koszko about 2 years ago
| background/policy_injector.js | ||
|---|---|---|
| 18 | 18 |
* IMPORT query_best |
| 19 | 19 |
* IMPORT sanitize_csp_header |
| 20 | 20 |
* IMPORT csp_rule |
| 21 |
* IMPORT is_csp_header_name |
|
| 21 | 22 |
* IMPORTS_END |
| 22 | 23 |
*/ |
| 23 | 24 |
|
| 24 | 25 |
var storage; |
| 25 | 26 |
|
| 26 |
const csp_header_names = new Set([ |
|
| 27 |
"content-security-policy", |
|
| 28 |
"x-webkit-csp", |
|
| 29 |
"x-content-security-policy" |
|
| 30 |
]); |
|
| 31 |
|
|
| 32 |
const report_only = "content-security-policy-report-only"; |
|
| 33 |
|
|
| 34 | 27 |
function headers_inject(details) |
| 35 | 28 |
{
|
| 36 | 29 |
const url = details.url; |
| ... | ... | |
| 40 | 33 |
const [pattern, settings] = query_best(storage, url); |
| 41 | 34 |
const allow = !!(settings && settings.allow); |
| 42 | 35 |
const nonce = gen_nonce(); |
| 43 |
const rule = `'nonce-${nonce}'`;
|
|
| 44 | 36 |
|
| 45 | 37 |
let orig_csp_headers; |
| 46 | 38 |
let old_signature; |
| ... | ... | |
| 70 | 62 |
} |
| 71 | 63 |
|
| 72 | 64 |
orig_csp_headers = orig_csp_headers || |
| 73 |
headers.filter(h => csp_header_names.has(h.name.toLowerCase())); |
|
| 74 |
headers = headers.filter(h => !csp_header_names.has(h.name.toLowerCase())); |
|
| 65 |
headers.filter(h => is_csp_header_name(h.name)); |
|
| 75 | 66 |
|
| 76 |
/* Remove headers that only snitch on us */ |
|
| 77 |
if (!allow) |
|
| 78 |
headers = headers.filter(h => h.name.toLowerCase() !== report_only); |
|
| 67 |
/* When blocking remove report-only CSP headers that snitch on us. */ |
|
| 68 |
headers = headers.filter(h => !is_csp_header_name(h.name, !allow)); |
|
| 79 | 69 |
|
| 80 | 70 |
if (old_signature) |
| 81 | 71 |
headers = headers.filter(h => h.name.search(old_signature) === -1); |
| 82 | 72 |
|
| 83 |
const sanitizer = h => sanitize_csp_header(h, rule, allow); |
|
| 73 |
const policy_object = {allow, nonce, url};
|
|
| 74 |
const sanitizer = h => sanitize_csp_header(h, policy_object); |
|
| 84 | 75 |
headers.push(...orig_csp_headers.map(sanitizer)); |
| 85 | 76 |
|
| 86 |
const policy = encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify({allow, nonce, url}));
|
|
| 77 |
const policy = encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(policy_object));
|
|
| 87 | 78 |
const policy_signature = sign_data(policy, new Date()); |
| 88 | 79 |
const later_30sec = new Date(new Date().getTime() + 30000).toGMTString(); |
| 89 | 80 |
headers.push({
|
| common/misc.js | ||
|---|---|---|
| 78 | 78 |
return `script-src ${rule}; script-src-elem ${rule}; script-src-attr 'none'; prefetch-src 'none';`;
|
| 79 | 79 |
} |
| 80 | 80 |
|
| 81 |
/* Check if some HTTP header might define CSP rules. */ |
|
| 82 |
const csp_header_names = new Set([ |
|
| 83 |
"content-security-policy", |
|
| 84 |
"x-webkit-csp", |
|
| 85 |
"x-content-security-policy" |
|
| 86 |
]); |
|
| 87 |
|
|
| 88 |
const report_only_header_name = "content-security-policy-report-only"; |
|
| 89 |
|
|
| 90 |
function is_csp_header_name(string, include_report_only) |
|
| 91 |
{
|
|
| 92 |
string = string && string.toLowerCase() || ""; |
|
| 93 |
|
|
| 94 |
return (include_report_only && string === report_only_header_name) || |
|
| 95 |
csp_header_names.has(string); |
|
| 96 |
} |
|
| 97 |
|
|
| 81 | 98 |
/* |
| 82 | 99 |
* Print item together with type, e.g. |
| 83 | 100 |
* nice_name("s", "hello") → "hello (script)"
|
| ... | ... | |
| 127 | 144 |
} |
| 128 | 145 |
|
| 129 | 146 |
/* Make CSP headers do our bidding, not interfere */ |
| 130 |
function sanitize_csp_header(header, rule, allow)
|
|
| 147 |
function sanitize_csp_header(header, policy)
|
|
| 131 | 148 |
{
|
| 149 |
const rule = `'nonce-${policy.nonce}'`;
|
|
| 132 | 150 |
const csp = parse_csp(header.value); |
| 133 | 151 |
|
| 134 |
if (!allow) {
|
|
| 152 |
if (!policy.allow) {
|
|
| 135 | 153 |
/* No snitching */ |
| 136 | 154 |
delete csp['report-to']; |
| 137 | 155 |
delete csp['report-uri']; |
| ... | ... | |
| 153 | 171 |
else |
| 154 | 172 |
csp['script-src-elem'] = [rule]; |
| 155 | 173 |
|
| 156 |
const new_policy = Object.entries(csp).map(
|
|
| 174 |
const new_csp = Object.entries(csp).map(
|
|
| 157 | 175 |
i => `${i[0]} ${i[1].join(' ')};`
|
| 158 | 176 |
); |
| 159 | 177 |
|
| 160 |
return {name: header.name, value: new_policy.join('')};
|
|
| 178 |
return {name: header.name, value: new_csp.join('')};
|
|
| 161 | 179 |
} |
| 162 | 180 |
|
| 163 | 181 |
/* Regexes and objest to use as/in schemas for parse_json_with_schema(). */ |
| ... | ... | |
| 178 | 196 |
* EXPORT extract_signed |
| 179 | 197 |
* EXPORT sign_data |
| 180 | 198 |
* EXPORT csp_rule |
| 199 |
* EXPORT is_csp_header_name |
|
| 181 | 200 |
* EXPORT nice_name |
| 182 | 201 |
* EXPORT open_in_settings |
| 183 | 202 |
* EXPORT is_privileged_url |
| content/main.js | ||
|---|---|---|
| 11 | 11 |
* IMPORT handle_page_actions |
| 12 | 12 |
* IMPORT extract_signed |
| 13 | 13 |
* IMPORT gen_nonce |
| 14 |
* IMPORT csp_rule |
|
| 15 | 14 |
* IMPORT is_privileged_url |
| 16 |
* IMPORT sanitize_attributes |
|
| 17 | 15 |
* IMPORT mozilla_suppress_scripts |
| 18 | 16 |
* IMPORT is_chrome |
| 19 | 17 |
* IMPORT is_mozilla |
| 20 | 18 |
* IMPORT start_activity_info_server |
| 19 |
* IMPORT modify_on_the_fly |
|
| 21 | 20 |
* IMPORTS_END |
| 22 | 21 |
*/ |
| 23 | 22 |
|
| 24 |
/* |
|
| 25 |
* Due to some technical limitations the chosen method of whitelisting sites |
|
| 26 |
* is to smuggle whitelist indicator in page's url as a "magical" string |
|
| 27 |
* after '#'. Right now this is only supplemental in HTTP(s) pages where |
|
| 28 |
* blocking of native scripts also happens through CSP header injection but is |
|
| 29 |
* necessary for protocols like ftp:// and file://. |
|
| 30 |
* |
|
| 31 |
* The code that actually injects the magical string into ftp:// and file:// |
|
| 32 |
* urls has not yet been added to the extension. |
|
| 33 |
*/ |
|
| 34 |
|
|
| 35 |
var nonce = undefined; |
|
| 36 |
|
|
| 37 |
function handle_mutation(mutations, observer) |
|
| 38 |
{
|
|
| 39 |
if (document.readyState === 'complete') {
|
|
| 40 |
console.log("mutation handling complete");
|
|
| 41 |
observer.disconnect(); |
|
| 42 |
return; |
|
| 43 |
} |
|
| 44 |
for (const mutation of mutations) {
|
|
| 45 |
for (const node of mutation.addedNodes) |
|
| 46 |
block_node(node); |
|
| 47 |
} |
|
| 48 |
} |
|
| 49 |
|
|
| 50 |
function block_nodes_recursively(node) |
|
| 51 |
{
|
|
| 52 |
block_node(node); |
|
| 53 |
for (const child of node.children) |
|
| 54 |
block_nodes_recursively(child); |
|
| 55 |
} |
|
| 56 |
|
|
| 57 |
function block_node(node) |
|
| 23 |
function accept_node(node, parent) |
|
| 58 | 24 |
{
|
| 25 |
const clone = document.importNode(node, false); |
|
| 26 |
node.hachette_corresponding = clone; |
|
| 59 | 27 |
/* |
| 60 |
* Modifying <script> element doesn't always prevent its execution in some
|
|
| 61 |
* Mozilla browsers. This is Chromium-specific code.
|
|
| 28 |
* TODO: Stop page's own issues like "Error parsing a meta element's
|
|
| 29 |
* content:" from appearing as extension's errors.
|
|
| 62 | 30 |
*/ |
| 63 |
if (node.tagName === "SCRIPT") {
|
|
| 64 |
block_script(node); |
|
| 65 |
return; |
|
| 66 |
} |
|
| 67 |
|
|
| 68 |
sanitize_attributes(node); |
|
| 69 |
|
|
| 70 |
if (node.tagName === "HEAD") |
|
| 71 |
inject_csp(node); |
|
| 72 |
} |
|
| 73 |
|
|
| 74 |
function block_script(node) |
|
| 75 |
{
|
|
| 76 |
/* |
|
| 77 |
* Disabling scripts this way allows them to still be relatively |
|
| 78 |
* easily accessed in case they contain some useful data. |
|
| 79 |
*/ |
|
| 80 |
if (node.hasAttribute("type"))
|
|
| 81 |
node.setAttribute("blocked-type", node.getAttribute("type"));
|
|
| 82 |
node.setAttribute("type", "application/json");
|
|
| 83 |
} |
|
| 84 |
|
|
| 85 |
function inject_csp(head) |
|
| 86 |
{
|
|
| 87 |
let meta = document.createElement("meta");
|
|
| 88 |
meta.setAttribute("http-equiv", "Content-Security-Policy");
|
|
| 89 |
meta.setAttribute("content", csp_rule(nonce));
|
|
| 90 |
|
|
| 91 |
if (head.firstElementChild === null) |
|
| 92 |
head.appendChild(meta); |
|
| 93 |
else |
|
| 94 |
head.insertBefore(meta, head.firstElementChild); |
|
| 31 |
parent.hachette_corresponding.appendChild(clone); |
|
| 95 | 32 |
} |
| 96 | 33 |
|
| 97 | 34 |
if (!is_privileged_url(document.URL)) {
|
| ... | ... | |
| 110 | 47 |
|
| 111 | 48 |
handle_page_actions(policy.nonce); |
| 112 | 49 |
|
| 113 |
if (!policy.allow) {
|
|
| 114 |
block_nodes_recursively(document.documentElement);
|
|
| 50 |
if (!policy.allow && is_mozilla)
|
|
| 51 |
addEventListener('beforescriptexecute', mozilla_suppress_scripts, true);
|
|
| 115 | 52 |
|
| 116 |
if (is_chrome) {
|
|
| 117 |
var observer = new MutationObserver(handle_mutation); |
|
| 118 |
observer.observe(document.documentElement, {
|
|
| 119 |
attributes: true, |
|
| 120 |
childList: true, |
|
| 121 |
subtree: true |
|
| 122 |
}); |
|
| 123 |
} |
|
| 53 |
if (!policy.allow && is_chrome) {
|
|
| 54 |
const old_html = document.documentElement; |
|
| 55 |
const new_html = document.createElement("html");
|
|
| 56 |
old_html.replaceWith(new_html); |
|
| 57 |
old_html.hachette_corresponding = new_html; |
|
| 124 | 58 |
|
| 125 |
if (is_mozilla) |
|
| 126 |
addEventListener('beforescriptexecute', mozilla_suppress_scripts, true);
|
|
| 59 |
const modify_end = |
|
| 60 |
modify_on_the_fly(old_html, policy, {node_eater: accept_node});
|
|
| 61 |
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", modify_end);
|
|
| 127 | 62 |
} |
| 128 | 63 |
|
| 129 | 64 |
start_activity_info_server(); |
| content/sanitize_document.js | ||
|---|---|---|
| 1 |
/** |
|
| 2 |
* Hachette modify HTML document as it loads and reconstruct HTML code from it |
|
| 3 |
* |
|
| 4 |
* Copyright (C) 2021 Wojtek Kosior |
|
| 5 |
* Redistribution terms are gathered in the `copyright' file. |
|
| 6 |
*/ |
|
| 7 |
|
|
| 8 |
/* |
|
| 9 |
* IMPORTS_START |
|
| 10 |
* IMPORT gen_nonce |
|
| 11 |
* IMPORT csp_rule |
|
| 12 |
* IMPORT is_csp_header_name |
|
| 13 |
* IMPORT sanitize_csp_header |
|
| 14 |
* IMPORT sanitize_attributes |
|
| 15 |
* IMPORTS_END |
|
| 16 |
*/ |
|
| 17 |
|
|
| 18 |
/* |
|
| 19 |
* Functions that sanitize elements. The script blocking measures are, when |
|
| 20 |
* possible, going to be applied together with CSP rules injected using |
|
| 21 |
* webRequest. |
|
| 22 |
*/ |
|
| 23 |
|
|
| 24 |
const blocked = "blocked"; |
|
| 25 |
|
|
| 26 |
function block_attribute(node, attr) |
|
| 27 |
{
|
|
| 28 |
/* |
|
| 29 |
* Disabling attributed this way allows them to still be relatively |
|
| 30 |
* easily accessed in case they contain some useful data. |
|
| 31 |
*/ |
|
| 32 |
|
|
| 33 |
const construct_name = [attr]; |
|
| 34 |
while (node.hasAttribute(construct_name.join("")))
|
|
| 35 |
construct_name.unshift(blocked); |
|
| 36 |
|
|
| 37 |
while (construct_name.length > 1) {
|
|
| 38 |
construct_name.shift(); |
|
| 39 |
const name = construct_name.join("");
|
|
| 40 |
node.setAttribute(`${blocked}-${name}`, node.getAttribute(name));
|
|
| 41 |
} |
|
| 42 |
|
|
| 43 |
node.removeAttribute(attr); |
|
| 44 |
} |
|
| 45 |
|
|
| 46 |
function sanitize_script(script, policy) |
|
| 47 |
{
|
|
| 48 |
if (policy.allow) |
|
| 49 |
return; |
|
| 50 |
|
|
| 51 |
block_attribute(script, "type"); |
|
| 52 |
script.setAttribute("type", "application/json");
|
|
| 53 |
} |
|
| 54 |
|
|
| 55 |
function inject_csp(head, policy) |
|
| 56 |
{
|
|
| 57 |
if (policy.allow) |
|
| 58 |
return; |
|
| 59 |
|
|
| 60 |
const meta = document.createElement("meta");
|
|
| 61 |
meta.setAttribute("http-equiv", "Content-Security-Policy");
|
|
| 62 |
meta.setAttribute("content", csp_rule(policy.nonce));
|
|
| 63 |
meta.hachette_ignore = true; |
|
| 64 |
head.prepend(meta); |
|
| 65 |
} |
|
| 66 |
|
|
| 67 |
function sanitize_http_equiv_csp_rule(meta, policy) |
|
| 68 |
{
|
|
| 69 |
const http_equiv = meta.getAttribute("http-equiv");
|
|
| 70 |
|
|
| 71 |
if (!is_csp_header_name(http_equiv, !policy.allow)) |
|
| 72 |
return; |
|
| 73 |
|
|
| 74 |
if (policy.allow || is_csp_header_name(http_equiv, false)) {
|
|
| 75 |
let value = meta.getAttribute("content");
|
|
| 76 |
block_attribute(meta, "content"); |
|
| 77 |
if (value) {
|
|
| 78 |
value = sanitize_csp_header({value}, policy).value;
|
|
| 79 |
meta.setAttribute("content", value);
|
|
| 80 |
} |
|
| 81 |
return; |
|
| 82 |
} |
|
| 83 |
|
|
| 84 |
block_attribute(meta, "http-equiv"); |
|
| 85 |
} |
|
| 86 |
|
|
| 87 |
function sanitize_node(node, policy) |
|
| 88 |
{
|
|
| 89 |
if (node.tagName === "SCRIPT") |
|
| 90 |
sanitize_script(node, policy); |
|
| 91 |
|
|
| 92 |
if (node.tagName === "HEAD") |
|
| 93 |
inject_csp(node, policy); |
|
| 94 |
|
|
| 95 |
if (node.tagName === "META") |
|
| 96 |
sanitize_http_equiv_csp_rule(node, policy); |
|
| 97 |
|
|
| 98 |
if (!policy.allow) |
|
| 99 |
sanitize_attributes(node, policy); |
|
| 100 |
} |
|
| 101 |
|
|
| 102 |
const serializer = new XMLSerializer(); |
|
| 103 |
|
|
| 104 |
function start_node(node, data) |
|
| 105 |
{
|
|
| 106 |
if (!data.writer) |
|
| 107 |
return; |
|
| 108 |
|
|
| 109 |
node.hachette_started = true; |
|
| 110 |
const clone = node.cloneNode(false); |
|
| 111 |
clone.textContent = data.uniq; |
|
| 112 |
data.writer(data.uniq_reg.exec(clone.outerHTML)[1]); |
|
| 113 |
} |
|
| 114 |
|
|
| 115 |
function finish_node(node, data) |
|
| 116 |
{
|
|
| 117 |
const nodes_to_process = [node]; |
|
| 118 |
|
|
| 119 |
while (true) {
|
|
| 120 |
node = nodes_to_process.pop(); |
|
| 121 |
if (!node) |
|
| 122 |
break; |
|
| 123 |
|
|
| 124 |
nodes_to_process.push(node, node.hachette_last_added); |
|
| 125 |
} |
|
| 126 |
|
|
| 127 |
while (nodes_to_process.length > 0) {
|
|
| 128 |
const node = nodes_to_process.pop(); |
|
| 129 |
node.remove(); |
|
| 130 |
|
|
| 131 |
if (!data.writer) |
|
| 132 |
continue; |
|
| 133 |
|
|
| 134 |
if (node.hachette_started) {
|
|
| 135 |
node.textContent = data.uniq; |
|
| 136 |
data.writer(data.uniq_reg.exec(node.outerHTML)[2]); |
|
| 137 |
continue; |
|
| 138 |
} |
|
| 139 |
|
|
| 140 |
data.writer(node.outerHTML || serializer.serializeToString(node)); |
|
| 141 |
} |
|
| 142 |
} |
|
| 143 |
|
|
| 144 |
/* |
|
| 145 |
* Important! Due to some weirdness node.parentElement is not alway correct |
|
| 146 |
* under Chromium. Track node relations manually. |
|
| 147 |
*/ |
|
| 148 |
function handle_added_node(node, true_parent, data) |
|
| 149 |
{
|
|
| 150 |
if (node.hachette_ignore || true_parent.hachette_ignore) |
|
| 151 |
return; |
|
| 152 |
|
|
| 153 |
if (!true_parent.hachette_started) |
|
| 154 |
start_node(true_parent, data) |
|
| 155 |
|
|
| 156 |
sanitize_node(node, data.policy); |
|
| 157 |
|
|
| 158 |
if (data.node_eater) |
|
| 159 |
data.node_eater(node, true_parent); |
|
| 160 |
|
|
| 161 |
finish_node(true_parent.hachette_last_added, data); |
|
| 162 |
|
|
| 163 |
true_parent.hachette_last_added = node; |
|
| 164 |
} |
|
| 165 |
|
|
| 166 |
function handle_mutation(mutations, data) |
|
| 167 |
{
|
|
| 168 |
/* |
|
| 169 |
* Chromium: for an unknown reason mutation.target is not always the same as |
|
| 170 |
* node.parentElement. The former is the correct one. |
|
| 171 |
*/ |
|
| 172 |
for (const mutation of mutations) {
|
|
| 173 |
for (const node of mutation.addedNodes) |
|
| 174 |
handle_added_node(node, mutation.target, data); |
|
| 175 |
} |
|
| 176 |
} |
|
| 177 |
|
|
| 178 |
function finish_processing(data) |
|
| 179 |
{
|
|
| 180 |
handle_mutation(data.observer.takeRecords(), data); |
|
| 181 |
finish_node(data.html_element, data); |
|
| 182 |
data.observer.disconnect(); |
|
| 183 |
} |
|
| 184 |
|
|
| 185 |
function modify_on_the_fly(html_element, policy, consumers) |
|
| 186 |
{
|
|
| 187 |
const uniq = gen_nonce(); |
|
| 188 |
const uniq_reg = new RegExp(`^(.*)${uniq}(.*)$`);
|
|
| 189 |
const data = {policy, html_element, uniq, uniq_reg, ...consumers};
|
|
| 190 |
|
|
| 191 |
start_node(data.html_element, data); |
|
| 192 |
|
|
| 193 |
var observer = new MutationObserver(m => handle_mutation(m, data)); |
|
| 194 |
observer.observe(data.html_element, {
|
|
| 195 |
attributes: true, |
|
| 196 |
childList: true, |
|
| 197 |
subtree: true |
|
| 198 |
}); |
|
| 199 |
|
|
| 200 |
data.observer = observer; |
|
| 201 |
|
|
| 202 |
return () => finish_processing(data); |
|
| 203 |
} |
|
| 204 |
|
|
| 205 |
/* |
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* EXPORTS_START |
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* EXPORT modify_on_the_fly |
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* EXPORTS_END |
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*/ |
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sanitize `' tags containing CSP rules under Chromium
This commit adds a mechanism of hijacking document when it loads and injecting sanitized nodes to the DOM from the level of content script.